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United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A-99-939-158)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling

Argued May 26, 2010
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL and
GARTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 8, 2010)

Man C. Yam, Esq. [ARGUED]
Law Offices of Beranrd & Yam
401 Broadway, Suite 1708
New York, NY 10013
Counsel for Petitioner

John W. Inkeles, Esq. [ARGUED]
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
450 5th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Counsel for Respondent

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
In October 2003, Jinyu Kang, a Korean citizen of China,
was named in a Chinese arrest warrant with two other
individuals, Zheyun Jin and Baoyu Jin, all three of whom were
members of a group called the “Human Rights Organization.”
They were being sought by the Chinese police for providing
food and shelter to North Korean refugees who had illegally
entered China on their way to South Korea.
After learning that there was a warrant for her arrest,
Kang fled China and illegally entered the United States in
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January 2004. She was later arrested by the Philadelphia police
for solicitation, but those charges were withdrawn. Kang
conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), but
applied for asylum, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3) on grounds of future persecution, and withholding of
removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Kang’s petition for asylum and
her application for withholding of removal based on future
persecution, but granted her relief under CAT. The BIA
affirmed except as to the CAT claim and therefore ordered Kang
removed. Kang has filed a petition for review, which we will
grant in part.
Kang is not contesting the IJ’s or the BIA’s decisions on
her asylum claim, but she contends that the IJ and the BIA erred
in denying her withholding of removal based on future
persecution, and that the BIA erred in reversing the IJ’s grant of
relief under CAT. We will grant Kang’s petition for review and
vacate and reverse the BIA’s decision on her CAT claim
because the BIA’s determination is not supported by substantial
evidence. Instead, the record compels the contrary conclusion,
namely, that it is more likely than not that Kang will be tortured
if returned to China.
I. Proceedings Before the Immigration Judge
The IJ held hearings on Kang’s claims on April 24, 2008,
and May 21, 2008, and issued a written decision on June 27,
2008. In his written decision, the IJ held that Kang’s asylum
claim was time-barred as it was not filed within 1 year after the
date of her arrival in the United States.
8 U.S.C. §
3

1158(a)(2)(B). On appeal, Kang does not challenge this ruling.
The IJ also denied withholding of removal on the ground of
future persecution under § 1231(b)(3). We need not address
Kang’s claim for withholding of removal based on future
persecution because we grant her relief under CAT.
Kang presented extensive evidence in support of her
application for withholding of removal under CAT. She
submitted affidavits from Zheyun Jin and Baoyu Jin, the two
other individuals named with her in the arrest warrant. Both
Zheyun Jin and Baoyu Jin recounted in detail that they were
subjected to abuse by Chinese officials while being interrogated
about the locations of other people involved in their
organization.
Zheyun Jin stated that, while interrogating him,
authorities beat him with police clubs, put bags over his head to
obstruct his breathing, poured cold water over him, pulled his
hair, forced him to kneel for hours, whipped the soles of his feet,
slapped him until his face was swollen and “blood [was]
streaming down,” deprived him of sleep, and tied him “to the
railing with [his] hands at the back and [his] feet hanging in the
air,” to the point that his arms were “almost broken.” App. 614.

Baoyu Jin stated that as part of her interrogation, Chinese
authorities deprived her of sleep to the point that her vision
deteriorated, and they obstructed her breathing by putting bags
over her head, causing her to faint several times. Baoyu Jin also
stated:
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They hung me on the awning, with my hands on
the back, and shot strong light beam directly into
my eyes. I could not even open my eyes, and my
tears coming down. Such painful experience was
beyond words. After I was hung up, the tip of my
toe could hardly touch the ground. When I felt
tired, and wished to stand on the heel of my feet,
my wrists felt great pain. Now both of my wrists
are swelling and can not exert strength. The
police also cuffed both my hands to a piece of
heating unit, and use the electric club to touch the
heating piece. The electric current flew through
my body, and I felt very painful. I still did not say
anything.
App. 618.
At the IJ’s hearing, Kang also offered the testimony of
Steven Kim, a United States citizen detained by the Chinese
authorities for 48 months for helping North Korean refugees
enter China illegally. Kim testified that he was spared from
being beaten while in custody only because he was an American
and the Chinese officials were afraid that if they mistreated him,
he would tell the American consular representative during the
representative’s monthly visits. However, Kim testified that
prisoners who were detained for aiding North Koreans were
handcuffed to iron bars and forced to stand for 48 hours at a
time. Kim also testified that harsh treatment was meted out
when prisoners gave unsatisfactory answers to questions about
the effort to assist the North Korean refugees, including
questions about their personal conduct and about the identities
5

and conduct of others involved. Kim stated that he had spoken
with a prisoner who, after refusing to answer these questions,
had been beaten, restrained, shocked with electricity, and
deprived of sleep for 48 hours at a time. Kim saw the scars on
that prisoner’s chest and wrist resulting from these beatings.
Along with his testimony, Kang also submitted an affidavit from
Kim reciting several of these allegations.
During her hearing before the IJ, Kang testified that she
believed she would be interrogated and tortured if she returned
to China because she had been a member of the Human Rights
Organization, left China without permission, and had applied for
asylum in the United States. She stated that members of her
organization who were detained by the Chinese authorities
reported that they had been beaten and tortured. Kang also
testified that the authorities interrogated her son to learn her
whereabouts, and that during this interrogation, he, too, was
beaten, kicked, deprived of sleep for several days, and detained
in solitary confinement. These allegations were corroborated by
the contents of an affidavit submitted by Kang’s son, wherein he
stated that after Kang fled the country, Chinese authorities
deprived him of sleep, slapped him on the face, kicked him in
the stomach, and pulled his hair when he refused to answer their
questions about where his mother had gone.
At the hearing, Kang also introduced a 2007 Country
Report on China issued by the U.S. State Department, which
reported that “there continued to be frequent reports that police
and other elements of the security apparatus employed
widespread torture and degrading treatment when dealing with
some detainees and prisoners.” App. 506. Although torture is
6

against the law in China, “the Supreme People’s Procuratorate
(SPP) Deputy Secretary Wang Zhenchuan acknowledged that
illegal interrogation by ‘atrocious torture’ existed in local
judicial practice throughout China.” Id. Prisoners reported
being tortured with “electric shocks, beatings, shackles,”
“suspension from the ceiling by [one’s] arms,” and being
“shackled and forced to sit in extreme positions for extended
periods of time.” App. 506-07. One prisoner recounted being
chained to an iron bed for days and another stated that he was
tied to a “tiger bench” for four hours. App. 506. When using a
“tiger bench,” the victim is seated on a bench with “legs tied
stretched out straight on the bench and hands tied behind a
vertical back support. Bricks or other hard objects are then
pushed under the victim’s legs or feet, causing the legs to bend
upwards, sometimes until they break.” Id. While the report
stated that torture was “on a decline--particularly in urban
areas,” it still noted that torture “remained widespread, and that
procedural and substantive measures were inadequate to prevent
torture.” App. 507. Despite Chinese courts “issu[ing] directives
to eliminate interrogation through torture” in 2006, there was an
8.3% increase in cases of “dereliction of duty and infringement
of rights by officials” from 2006 to 2007. Id.
The IJ granted withholding of removal under CAT,
concluding that “[t]he overall record evidence more than
suggests that [Kang’s] fears of likely prospective torture through
the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering while in the
Chinese government’s custody or physical control has merit.”
App. 325. Although the IJ specifically cited only Kim’s
testimony and the Country Report, it is clear that he considered
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the record as a whole before reaching this conclusion.1
II. The BIA’s Ruling
The Government appealed the IJ’s grant of withholding
of removal under CAT, and Kang cross-appealed the denial of
asylum and withholding of removal under § 1231. The BIA
affirmed the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal
under § 1231, and reversed the IJ’s grant of withholding of
removal under CAT.
With respect to withholding of removal under CAT, the
BIA concluded that the “IJ erred in determining that it is more
likely than not that [Kang] would be tortured if returned to
China.” App. 24. The BIA determined that the Country Report
was not persuasive because, while it stated that there are
frequent reports of torture in China, it “does not indicate that
those imprisoned for smuggling were specifically at risk or
routinely subjected to torture.” Id. The BIA described Kim’s

1

The IJ noted a “disconnect between [Kang’s] testimony
and the information in the arrest warrant” (specifically, an
inconsistency between the date the arrest warrant was issued and
the date Kang testified that she learned of the arrest warrant),
but, despite noting that there was “confusion” surrounding the
arrest warrant, he did not make an adverse credibility finding.
App. 321. “We have several times affirmed the rule that where
an IJ or the BIA fails to make an explicit credibility finding, we
will proceed as if the applicant’s testimony were credible.”
Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2006).
8

testimony as stating “that some people were beaten by other
inmates and guards, chained for prolonged periods, and
subjected to severe conditions and interrogations,” and decided
that “[a]lthough conditions in Chinese prisons may be harsh, and
incidents of torture may occur, we find that the respondent has
failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she
would be subjected to treatment specifically intended to torture
her while imprisoned.” Id.
The BIA also stated that “[t]he record does not establish
that the Chinese authorities use torture as a matter of policy, and
the Country Report indicates that the incidents of torture are on
the decline and that the government is taking steps to eliminate
interrogation through torture.” App. 25. The BIA thus
concluded that “the respondent has failed to establish that the
severe instances of mistreatment found in the record are so
pervasive as to establish that a person detained in a Chinese
prison will be more likely than not be subjected to torture, as
opposed to other acts of punishment or treatment, which do not
amount to torture.” Id.
In its decision, the BIA specifically referred only to
Kim’s testimony and the Country Report. The BIA completely
ignored the rest of the record, including the affidavits of Zheyun
Jin, Baoyu Jin, and Kang’s son.
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).
We exercise jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because the
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BIA did not adopt or defer to the IJ’s opinion regarding Kang’s
CAT claim, we review only the BIA’s decision. Abdulai v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). We review the
BIA’s legal determinations de novo, “subject to the principles of
[Chevron] deference.” Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184
(3d Cir. 2008). While our review of the BIA’s decision is
deferential, “deference is not due where findings and
conclusions are based on inferences or presumptions that are not
reasonably grounded in the record, viewed as a whole.”
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). The BIA may not ignore evidence in
the record that favors the petitioner. Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y
Gen., _ F.3d _, No. 08-4170, 2010 WL 2179195 at *11 (3d Cir.
June 2, 2010). To reverse the BIA’s finding we must find that
the evidence “compels” a different result. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
[T]he BIA’s determinations will be upheld if they
are supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence in the record considered as a
whole. Under the substantial evidence standard,
the BIA’s determinations must be upheld unless
the evidence not only supports a contrary
conclusion, but compels it. However, as just
suggested, the BIA must substantiate its
decisions. We will not accord the BIA deference
where its findings and conclusions are based on
inferences or presumptions that are not reasonably
grounded in the record.
Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 589 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal
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quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
Here, the BIA reviewed the IJ’s grant of CAT relief de
novo. The BIA’s ruling in this case was issued before we
decided Kaplun v. Attorney General, 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir.
2010), where we set forth a two-part standard of review for the
BIA to apply in reviewing an IJ’s determination of a CAT claim.
Kaplun held that the BIA should review the IJ’s factual
determination of the likelihood of mistreatment under a clear
error standard, and should apply a de novo standard of review as
to whether the mistreatment would legally constitute torture. Id.
at 272. Therefore, to reverse the IJ’s ruling under Kaplun, the
BIA would have to conclude either that the IJ clearly erred in
determining the likelihood that Kang would be tortured if
removed or, under a de novo standard, that the IJ’s legal
determination as to torture was wrong. Under Kaplun, we will
uphold the BIA’s reversal of the IJ’s grant of CAT relief if there
is substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s conclusion that the
IJ clearly erred in finding a likelihood of torture, or if we
determine that the alleged mistreatment does not legally
constitute torture. Conversely, we will reverse the BIA’s
determination if the evidence compels a finding that it is more
likely than not that the petitioner will be tortured if removed.
The Government contends that a remand for the BIA to
review the IJ’s determination under Kaplun is unnecessary
because Kang has not shown a likelihood of torture. We agree
that a remand is not necessary, but for the opposite reason. We
hold that the BIA’s reversal of the IJ, and determination that
Kang was not entitled to relief under CAT, was not supported by
substantial evidence and that the record compels the opposite
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conclusion (as a matter of fact and law). Thus, we need not
remand for the BIA to analyze the IJ’s decision under the
Kaplun standard of review.
IV. Convention Against Torture
Kang contends that the BIA erred in reversing the IJ’s
grant of withholding under CAT because the evidence presented
before the IJ compelled the conclusion that it was more likely
than not that she would be tortured if returned to China, and
because the BIA’s decision to the contrary is not supported by
substantial evidence. We agree.
The Government responds that Kang only provided
evidence of substandard prison conditions in China, and
“mistreatment” of some prisoners, which is insufficient to
prevail on a CAT claim. The Government urges that the BIA
relied on certain factual findings by the IJ, including the fact that
Kim was not tortured despite being convicted of aiding North
Korean refugees, and that Kim testified “that only those
prisoners who broke the prison rules were mistreated.”
Respondent’s Br. at 25. Additionally, the Government describes
the Country Report as stating “that people arrested for harboring
illegal aliens were not amongst the groups most prone to
mistreatment.” 2 Id.
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The Country Report states that, according to a “UN
Special Rapporteur,” “officials specifically targeted for abuse
house church groups, Falun Gong adherents, Tibetans, and
Uighur prisoners.” App. 507. This does not indicate that those
12

The Government also notes that in Pierre, 528 F.3d at
189, we held that CAT “requires a petitioner to show that his
prospective torturer will have the motive or purpose to cause
him pain or suffering,” and argues that the IJ did not make any
factual findings that would support a determination of such
“specific intent.” Respondent’s Supp. Br. at 4-5. According to
the Government, Kang “failed to make a showing of specific
intent to inflict pain and suffering upon her.” Id. at 7. Instead,
the Government claims that Kang’s allegations are similar to
claims that we rejected in two other cases involving prison
conditions--Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 146-47 (3d Cir.
2005), and Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir.
2006)--in that Kang has not claimed “past torture or
mistreatment directed specifically at her.” Respondent’s. Supp.
Br. at 7-8.3

arrested for aiding North Koreans are unlikely to be tortured.
3

In Auguste and Francois, the petitioners provided
evidence of deplorable prison conditions in Haiti as well as
beatings of prisoners by guards. We rejected the petitioners’
claims that they were entitled to withholding under CAT
because there was no reason to believe that the petitioners were
especially likely to be targeted for mistreatment. Pierre, 528
F.3d at 183, 189. The deficiency in the petitioners’ claims in
Auguste and Francois was that they could not show that
“Haitian officials will have the purpose of inflicting severe pain
or suffering by placing [the petitioners] in detention upon [their]
removal from the United States.” Pierre, 528 F.3d at 190; see
also Auguste, 395 F.3d at 153-54; Francois, 448 F.3d at 651-52.
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A petitioner seeking withholding of removal under CAT
must show that “it is more likely than not that he or she would
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). All evidence relevant to the possibility
of future torture should be considered when assessing if a
petitioner is more likely than not to be tortured if removed. Id.
§ 208.16(c)(3). The regulations set out the following definition
of torture:
Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him
or her for an act he or she or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed,
or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.

Deplorable prison conditions do not, by themselves, constitute
torture. In contrast, Kang presented considerable evidence to
support a finding of specific intent to inflict severe pain and a
finding that she would be specifically targeted.
14

8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). In addition, “[i]n order to constitute
torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering.” § 208.18(a)(5). We have
stated that “CAT requires a showing of specific intent before the
court can make a finding that a petitioner will be tortured.”
Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189. A petitioner must demonstrate “that his
prospective torturer will have the motive or purpose to cause
him pain or suffering.” Id.
We conclude that the evidence compels the conclusion
that Kang has met this burden. The BIA’s assessment of the
evidence, as well as the Government’s argument portraying the
evidence as involving mere prison conditions and ignoring the
inherently torturous nature of the treatment about which the
witnesses testified, are inexplicable. Moreover, the BIA appears
to have totally ignored the most forceful record evidence.
Zheyun Jin’s and Baoyu Jin’s affidavits stated that, in an effort
to force them to disclose the locations of other members of their
organization, Chinese officials beat them, poured cold water
over them, whipped them, put plastic bags over their heads to
suffocate them, hung them in the air, shined bright lights into
their eyes, deprived them of sleep, and shocked them with
electrical current.
During her hearing, Kang similarly testified that members
of her organization had been suffocated with plastic bags and
beaten. Kang also testified, corroborated by her son’s affidavit-also ignored by the BIA--that when police interrogated her son
about her whereabouts, they beat him, kicked him, and deprived
him of sleep for several days. During Kang’s hearing and in a
written affidavit, Kim testified that he had heard of or observed
15

other prisoners being beaten, forced to stand for 48 hours at a
time, deprived of sleep, and electrically shocked as part of
interrogations regarding their involvement with the North
Korean refugees. The 2007 Country Report corroborated these
claims, reporting that torture in China was “widespread” and
that it involved many of the methods described above. App.
506-07.
In light of this evidence, the BIA’s conclusion that Kang
failed to show the required likelihood of torture falls short of
satisfying the substantial evidence standard; rather, it is contrary
to the evidence in the record. Although we generally defer to
the BIA’s conclusion, the BIA may not “simply overlook
evidence in the record” that supports Kang’s claim. EspinosaCortez, 2010 WL 2179195 at *11. In its opinion, the BIA
ignored the majority of the evidence that Kang presented,
including the most telling evidence of torture, and instead
mentioned only the Country Report and Kim’s testimony. The
BIA concluded that, even if torture occurred in Chinese prisons,
Kang had not demonstrated that it was more likely than not that
she would be tortured if returned to China. Significantly, the
BIA did not mention the testimony of individuals who were
similarly situated to Kang. Kang’s situation in China is unlike
Kim’s because he is an American citizen. By contrast, Zheyun
Jin and Baoyu Jin were named in the same arrest warrant as
Kang, and Kang’s son was specifically interrogated and abused
in order to elicit information about Kang herself. Because the
BIA relied on only Kim’s testimony and the Country Report,
and completely ignored the other affidavits, its conclusions are
not “reasonably grounded in the record”; therefore, we owe its
decision no deference. Sheriff, 587 F.3d at 589.
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The record compels the conclusion that if Kang is
removed to China it is more likely than not that she will be
beaten, suffocated, deprived of sleep, shocked with electrical
current, and/or forced to stand for long periods of time, and that
this would be done with the purpose of causing her severe pain
and suffering. Other individuals accused of precisely the same
crime as Kang were subjected to this treatment, for the purpose
of forcing them to disclose information about their organization.
Moreover, her son was abused in order to elicit information
about Kang herself. There is no doubt that this treatment
satisfies the legal definition of torture: it involves the
intentional infliction of “severe pain or suffering,” “for such
purposes as obtaining . . . information [from] . . . or punishing”
an individual, “with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official,” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1), and with “the motive or
purpose to cause pain or suffering,” Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189.
The types of abuse suffered by Zheyun Jin and Baoyu Jin are not
merely evidence of deplorable prison conditions. The acts
themselves compel the conclusion that they were intended to
inflict pain.
The Government’s contentions to the contrary are utterly
without merit. We are greatly troubled that the Government
urges that the evidence introduced by Kang is merely evidence
of substandard prison conditions. The Government completely
mischaracterizes Kim’s testimony on this issue. Kim’s
testimony was not limited to describing prison conditions.
Rather, he testified that prisoners were subjected to the acts
described above when they failed to disclose a satisfactory
amount of information during interrogations. Furthermore, as
described in detail above, Kang presented substantial evidence
17

that other individuals in her organization were tortured, and the
disturbing descriptions of their interrogations compel the
conclusion that the authorities acted with the purpose of
inflicting serious pain and suffering. No other purpose could
explain the horrific experiences detailed in the affidavits
presented to the IJ.
It is disappointing, even shocking, that the government
fails to acknowledge that the evidence is not only strongly in
Kang’s favor, but, indeed, compels the conclusion that she will
likely be tortured. An attorney representing the United States
“carries a double burden.” Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d
295, 296 (5th Cir. 1958). To be sure, “he owes an obligation to
the government, just as any attorney owes an obligation to his
client, to conduct his case zealously.” Id. However, at the same
time he must be ever cognizant that “he is the representative of
a government dedicated to fairness and equal justice to all and,
in this respect, he owes a heavy obligation to [his adversary].”
Id. Unfortunately, in this case, “zeal was permitted to outrun
fairness.” United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1147 (5th
Cir. 1974). The Government, upon viewing the compelling
evidence in the record, should have realized that the BIA’s
decision to deny Kang CAT relief was wrong and therefore
ought to have come before this Court in support of Kang’s
petition, rather than against it. Instead, the Government sought
to characterize the facts in such a way so as to distract the Court
from the dire nature of Kang’s plight. While our adversarial
system may permit such advocacy by private parties - when the
United States appears before us, it is duty-bound to “cut square
corners” and seek justice rather than victory. We are distressed
that it failed to do so in this case.
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We conclude that, because the BIA ignored
overwhelming probative evidence produced by Kang, its
findings were not reasonably grounded in the record and thus we
accord no deference to the BIA’s decision. Considering the
record as a whole, we find that the BIA’s determination was not
based on substantial evidence. Rather, the evidence instead
compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not that Kang
will be tortured if returned to China. While ordinarily “the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is [for an appellate
court] to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation,” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.
729, 744 (1985), “[w]here application of the correct legal
principles to the record could lead only to the same
conclusion, there is no need to require agency
reconsideration.” Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 409 (2d Cir.
2010) (alterations omitted, emphasis added). The case before us
is one of those “rare circumstances” where remand is not
necessary, since, as set forth above, the record evidence
overwhelmingly supports - and indeed, compels - the conclusion
that Kang’s petition for withholding of removal under CAT
should be granted, and no amount of reconsideration by the BIA
would change that. Accordingly, we reverse the BIA’s decision,
and grant Kang’s petition for withholding of removal pursuant
to CAT.
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